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GOTTA FIGHT FOR YOUR RIGHT TO PERFORM:  
SCOPE OF NEW YORK COMMON LAW 
COPYRIGHT FOR PRE-1972 SOUND 
RECORDINGS POST-NAXOS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Although the Constitution endows Congress with the power “[t]o 
promote the . . . useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective Writings,”1 the States 
have been able to regulate copyrights up to the point federal law governs.2  
When Congress amended the Copyright Act in 1976, it preempted state and 
common copyright law while also creating a quirk in copyright law that 
made sound recordings prior to February 15, 1972 subject to state law.3  
The existence of copyright protection for sound recordings in New York 
was unknown until the Court of Appeals, in Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos 
of America, Inc. (Naxos I), held that a common law copyright does exist in 
that state.4  Despite this finding, the Court of Appeals did not define the 
scope of the copyright.5  It left unanswered whether New York’s common 
law copyright protected owners of sound recordings solely against unau-
thorized copying, or whether it was expansive enough to include rights not 
even given to them under federal law, namely a performance right for 
sound recordings.6 
 This paper argues that a performance right exists under New York 
common law copyright for pre-1972 sound recordings.  Part I examines the 
development of copyright law in the United States to give background for 
the Naxos I case.7  Part II discusses Naxos I, including the facts, procedural 
                                                           
1.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
2.  See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 560 (1973).  States have exercised that 
power both through their common law and through legislation.  See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. 
Naxos of Am., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250, 256–57 (N.Y. 2005) [hereinafter Naxos I]; See also CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 980 (2007). 
3.  See 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2008). 
4.  See Naxos I, 830 N.E.2d at 265. 
5.  See Naxos I, 830 N.E.2d at 250. 
6.  See id. 
7.  As the New York Court of Appeals noted in Naxos I, “when examining copyright law 
‘a page of history is worth a volume of logic.’” Naxos I, 830 N.E.2d at 254 (quoting New York 
Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921). 
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posture, and the holding of the case.  Part III then discusses the historical 
scope of common law copyright protection and argues that there is a com-
mon law performance right for sound recordings. 
II.  THE DUAL SYSTEM OF COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 
Prior to Congress’s passage of the Copyright Act of 1976, copyright 
law in the United States consisted of a dual system of federal and state pro-
tection.8  Any works capable of copyright protection had a perpetual, com-
mon law copyright up to the point of publication.9  Infringement of this 
copyright was governed by state law.10  At the point of first publication, the 
law divested the owner of any common law copyright protection,11 and the 
only copyright protection available was federal statutory protection, which 
limited the duration of copyright protection and provided other limits on 
the expansive monopoly.12 
With the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress, for the most 
part, eliminated the dual system of copyright by expressly preempting any 
state or common law rights or remedies for any work covered by statutory 
copyright protection.13  This included unpublished works.14  However, 
Congress carved out certain exceptions to the preemption.15  Most impor-
tantly, the federal law does not preempt state or common law copyright 
protection over sound recordings fixed prior to February 15, 1972, and will 
not do so until February 15, 2067.16  Thus, prior to publication, state law 
determines the copyright protection of pre-1972 sound recordings.  Nota-
bly, under New York common law, distributing phonorecords or perform-
ing a sound recording does not rise to “publication” for purposes of the 
copyright law.17  Since there is arguably no way to “publish” sound record-
ings, pre-1972 sound recordings enjoy common law protection even though 
                                                           
8.  See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.02 (Mat-
thew Bender, Rev. Ed. 2009). 
9.  See id. 
10.  See id. 
11.  See id. (noting that notwithstanding some statutory protection, the owner’s work en-
tered the public domain). 
12.  See id.; see also Naxos I, 830 N.E.2d at 256–57, 263 (noting that twelve of the first 
thirteen states, under the Articles of Confederation, passed copyright statutes, and that these stat-
utes were superseded when Congress, under the Constitution, passed a federal copyright statute). 
13.  See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2008). 
14.  Id. 
15.  See 17 U.S.C. § 301(b) (2008). 
16.  See 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2008). 
17.  See, e.g., Naxos I, 830 N.E.2d at 259–60, 264. 
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they are widely distributed and performed.18 
 On October 19, 1976, Congress passed the largest revision to the 
Copyright Act since 1909.19  The Act made explicit that sound recordings 
are copyrightable,20 but it also explicitly withheld a performance right for 
those sound recordings.21  The Act also preempted all legal or equitable 
rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general 
scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that 
are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject 
matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created 
before or after that date and whether published or unpublished.22 
However, the Act specifically carved out an exception for sound re-
cordings fixed before February 15, 1972.23  Preemption of state or common 
law rights in these sound recordings will not occur until February 15, 
2067.24  Thus, Congress preserved the dual-system of copyright, with state 
protection (possibly) extending to sound recordings fixed prior to February 
15, 1972, and federal protection extending to everything else.25  Notably, 
twenty years later, Congress created a limited performance right in sound 
recordings by passing the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings 
Act of 1995 (DPRA).26  This act added subsection six to section 106, which 
stated that the owner of a copyright to a sound recording has the exclusive 
right “to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio 
transmission.”27  Section 114 was amended to set forth the requirements 
and limitations of this new right.28  Currently, Congress is considering 
amending the Copyright Act to add a full performance right to sound re-
cordings.29  Regardless, Congress has not signaled any desire to extend 
                                                           
18.  See id. at 250. 
19.  See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).  
20.  17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (2006). 
21.  17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (2006). 
22.  17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2008). 
23.  17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2008). 
24.  Id. 
25.  This seems strange because the intention of the revision was to create a uniform law.  
See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 129 (1976). 
26.  Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 
Stat. 336 (1996) [hereinafter DPRA]. 
27.  Id. at § 2.  See also 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (1996).  
28.  DPRA, Pub. L. No. 104-39 at § 3.  See also 17 U.S.C. § 114 (1998); Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304 § 405, 112 Stat. 2860, 2890–99 (1998) (further amend-
ing § 114).  
29.  See Performance Rights Act, S. 379, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009); Performance Rights Act, 
H.R. 848, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009).  However, these bills simply delete “digital” from § 106(6), so 
they would not create a general performance right.  For example, a musical composition played 
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federal protection to pre-1972 sound recordings. 
III.  CAPITOL RECORDS, INC. V. NAXOS OF AMERICA, INC.:  COMMON LAW 
COPYRIGHT FOR PRE-1972 SOUND RECORDINGS COMES TO NEW YORK 
 Prior to 2004, the question of whether New York common law 
copyright protected sound recordings had never been answered by the 
Court of Appeals, New York’s highest court.30  Noting this, the Second 
Circuit, in Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of America, Inc. (Naxos II), hear-
ing an appeal from the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for the 
defendant, certified questions to the Court of Appeals.31  The Court of Ap-
peals held that New York’s common law copyright protected pre-1972 
sound recordings until federal law preempts state protection in 2067.32 
 Naxos I involved a dispute over 1930s sound recordings of classical 
musical performances by three world-renowned artists.33  In 1996, EMI 
Records Limited, the owner of the sound recordings, granted Capitol Re-
cords, Inc. (Capitol) “an exclusive license to exploit the recordings in the 
United States.”34  Capitol used modern electronic methods to remaster the 
recordings and improve their audio quality.35  Around the same time, 
Naxos of America (Naxos),36 a manufacturer and distributor of phonore-
cords, wanted to preserve the recordings and distribute them.37  It located 
copies of the original recordings and used its own process to restore their 
quality in the United Kingdom.38  In 1999, Naxos began distributing the re-
cordings in the United States.39  Capitol demanded it cease and desist the 
distribution, but Naxos rebuffed the demand.40  Capitol sued Naxos in 2002 
in the district court for the Southern District of New York, claiming “com-
mon-law copyright infringement, unfair competition, misappropriation and 
                                                                                                                                      
on television is entitled to royalties for that performance.  Since the plain language of the statute 
is limited to audio transmissions, it would seem not to apply to television transmissions. 
30.  Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 372 F.3d 471, 484 (2d. Cir. 2004) [here-
inafter Naxos II]. 
31.  Id. at 484–85. 
32.  Naxos I, 830 N.E.2d at 263. 
33.  Id. at 252. 
34.  Id. at 253. 
35.  Id. 
36.  See About Naxos.com, NAXOS.COM, http://www.naxos.com/aboutus.asp (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2010). 
37.  Naxos I, 830 N.E.2d at 253. 
38.  Id. 
39.  Id. 
40.  Id. 
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unjust enrichment,” premised on New York state law.41  The court granted 
summary judgment for Naxos, concluding that “Capitol did not have intel-
lectual property rights in the original recordings because its copyrights had 
expired in the United Kingdom.”42  On appeal, the Second Circuit con-
cluded that this case raised “several unsettled issues of New York law” and 
certified three questions to the Court of Appeals.43 
To answer the certified questions, the Court of Appeals traced the his-
tory of common law copyright protection from the beginning in the United 
Kingdom to the present day in the United States.44  Specifically, in New 
York, the Court noted that the first New York State Constitution “permitted 
the continuation of colonial common law, derived from English common 
law.”45  The common law provided for perpetual copyright protection, ab-
sent abrogation by statute.46  In 1786, the state legislature passed a copy-
right statute, which placed a copyright term of twenty-eight years after first 
publication.47  After Congress passed a federal copyright statute that pre-
empted any state copyright laws, the Court of Appeals held that “New York 
common law would provide copyright protection to a literary work up to 
the point that federal law governed.”48  Accordingly, because federal copy-
right law did not protect sound recordings, New York common law could 
provide perpetual copyright protection to these recordings.49  The court 
concluded that both the judiciary and the legislature intended to protect 
owners of sound recordings.50  With the amendments to the Copyright Act 
giving federal protection to sound recordings, the court noted that the state 
                                                           
41.  Id. 
42.  Id. (citing Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 204, 210 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003)). 
43.  Id. (quoting Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 372 F.3d 471, 484–85 (2d 
Cir. 2004)).  Those three questions were: 
(1) Does the expiration of the term of a copyright in the country of origin terminate 
a common law copyright in New York?   
(2) Does a cause of action for common law copyright infringement include some or 
all of the elements of unfair competition?   
(3) Is a claim for common law copyright infringement defeated by a defendant’s 
showing that the plaintiff’s work has slight if any current market and that the de-
fendant’s work, although using components of the plaintiff’s work is fairly to be 
regarded as a “new product?”   
Id. 
44.  Id. at 253-62. 
45.  Id. at 262.  See also N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXV. 
46.  Naxos I, 830 N.E.2d at 262-63. 
47.  Id. at 263 (citing Act of Apr. 29, 1786, L. 1786, ch. 54 (an act to promote literature)). 
48.  Id. (citations omitted). 
49.  Id. 
50.  Id. 
 
594        LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:589 
 
common law protection had been abrogated in two respects:  sound record-
ings made after February 15, 1972 do not have common law protection be-
cause they have federal protection; and the state common law protection is 
no longer perpetual since the federal law will preempt the state common 
law on February 15, 2067.51  Having concluded that New York common 
law copyright protected sound recordings made prior to February 15, 1972 
until 2067, the court then determined that “the public sale of a sound re-
cording . . . does not constitute a publication sufficient to divest the owner 
of common-law copyright protection.”52 
 Turning to the certified questions, the court held that New York 
common law copyright protection extends to sound recordings even though 
they are in the public domain in the country of origin.53  It also held that a 
common law “copyright infringement cause of action . . . consists of two 
elements:  “(1) the existence of a valid copyright; and (2) unauthorized re-
production of the work protected by the copyright.”54  Finally, the court 
noted that the popularity of a product, or the argument that it can be con-
sidered a new work, will not defeat a common law copyright claim.55 
 Therefore, post-Naxos I, it is clear that New York extends common 
law copyright protection to sound recordings made before February 15, 
1972.56  However, the court did not determine the scope of that protection; 
namely, whether copyright protection extends to unauthorized public per-
formances of the sound recording.57  A discussion of the history of the bun-
dle of rights under copyright law will shed some light on the subject. 
IV.  PUBLIC PERFORMANCE RIGHTS HISTORICALLY UNDER COPYRIGHT 
LAW 
 As noted above, Congress can enact as expansive a copyright statute 
as it wants, as long as it is limited to “writings”58 and is of limited dura-
                                                           
51.  Naxos I, 830 N.E.2d at 263. 
52.  Id. at 264 (citations omitted).  Interestingly, the court noted that this was the “law in 
this state for over 50 years,” yet it did not cite to a Court of Appeals opinion establishing that, 
instead relying on one Second Circuit decision, an Appellate Division decision, and two New 
York Supreme Court decisions, as well as an unsigned Note.  See id. 
53.  Id. at 265. 
54.  Naxos I, 830 N.E.2d at 266.  The court also held that a common law copyright in-
fringement cause of action is not synonymous with an unfair competition cause of action.  Id. 
55.  Id. at 266-67. 
56.  Id. at 263. 
57.  See id. (no discussion of the public performance issue). 
58.  “Writings” as interpreted by the Supreme Court is an expansive definition that is not 
limited to the literal written word.  See Burrows-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 
 
2010] SCOPE OF NEW YORK COMMON LAW 595 
 
tion.59  As many commentators note, Congress has not exhausted this 
power.60  Thus, even though sound recordings do not have a full statutory 
performance right, it is possible that a performance right exists under 
common law.  Because the Copyright Act expressly permits state or com-
mon law remedies for pre-1972 recordings,61 it is important to look at the 
historical scope of common law copyright to determine the existence of a 
performance right. 
 Copyright is considered a property right.  Under the common law, a 
copyright embodied similar rights to other common law property rights; 
principally, the exclusive right to possess, use, and dispose of the prop-
erty.62  Blackstone noted the expansiveness of the common law copyright 
in his Commentaries when he wrote that any unauthorized use of a person’s 
original work is “an invasion of his right of property.” 63 
Under the common law, unlike statutory copyright, this exclusive 
right, or monopoly over the literary work, existed into perpetuity.64  How-
ever, publication of the work divested the owner of any common law copy-
right, and the work entered the public domain unless it obtained statutory 
protection.65 
By way of analogy, the common law rights given to unpublished 
plays are instructive.  Like sound recordings and musical compositions, the 
real value of a play is its performance.  In fact, plays—known as “dramatic 
compositions” under copyright law—received a statutory performance right 
prior to musical compositions.66  However, the statutory rights only at-
tached if the play was published; if the author merely wrote it down in 
manuscript form for the actors to memorize, then no statutory right at-
tached because it was considered unpublished.67  A play that existed only in 
                                                                                                                                      
58 (1884) (holding that “writings . . . include[s] all forms of writing, printing, engraving, etching, 
etc. [sic], by which the ideas in the mind of the author are given visible expression”). 
59.  STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 95TH CONG., REPORT ON PERFORMANCE 
RIGHTS IN SOUND RECORDINGS 15 (Comm. Print 1978).  
60.  See, e.g., id. 
61.  Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976). 
62.  See, e.g., Waring v. WDAS Broad. Station, Inc., 194 A. 631, 634 (Pa. 1937). 
63.  2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 405–06. 
64.  See, e.g., Naxos I, 830 N.E.2d at 262–63.  
65.  See, e.g., id. at 257–58. 
66.  In 1856, Congress extended protection to “dramatic compositions” and included a 
public performance right for those particular works.  See Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, § 1, 11 
Stat. 138, 138–39, reprinted in LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, 1783–1900, 
at 41 (1900).  It was not until 1897 that a public performance right was extended to musical com-
positions.  See Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch.4, 29 Stat. 481, 481–82 (amending 60 U.S. Rev. Stat. 
§ 4966), reprinted in id. at 61–62 (1900). 
67.  See EATON S. DRONE,  A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL 
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manuscript form enjoyed common law protection, and the owner of the 
play could restrain those from performing it.68 
Courts struggled with the issue of whether performing an unpublished 
play constituted publication such that the owner was divested of common 
law protection.69  One New York case bears on this issue.  In Palmer v. 
DeWitt, the New York Court of Appeals noted that, absent an intent to 
dedicate the work to the public, an author retains a right in the work and 
can prevent others from publishing it.70  “The permission to act a play at a 
public theater does not amount to an abandonment by the author of his title 
to it, or to a dedication of it to the public.”71  Given that owners of unpub-
lished plays had a common law right to restrain public performance of their 
works,72 it would not require any stretch of the law to hold that the same is 
true for sound recordings.  First, plays can exist in unpublished form yet be 
widely distributed.  As long as the play remained in manuscript form, it 
remained unpublished.73  Similarly, a sound recording fixed onto a phon-
orecord is considered unpublished.74  Both pre-1978 unpublished plays and 
unpublished pre-1972 sound recordings are governed by the common law.75  
Second, a performance right is necessary to protect the author’s interest in 
the most valuable aspect of the play and the sound recording—the effect 
the play or sound recording has on the viewing and listening public.  Peo-
ple want to see plays performed on stage, and they want to listen to sound 
recordings being performed. 
Given the nature of common law copyright, especially as it relates to 
                                                                                                                                      
PRODUCTIONS 574 (Boston, MA, Little, Brown, and Co. 1879).  
68.  See, e.g., id. 
69.  In Keene v. Wheatley, a federal district court stated, in dicta, that public performance 
of an unpublished play was a limited publication such that a person, relying solely on memory, 
could also perform the play without violating the author’s rights. 14 F. Cas. 180, 201 (E.D. Pa. 
1861) (No. 7644).  However, a person writing down the play while watching an authorized per-
formance and then using that manuscript to perform the play without authorization would be a 
violation.  Id. at 204–05, 207.  Commentators criticized this distinction, believing that any unau-
thorized performance would violate an author’s common law right.  See id.  Shortly after the 
Wheatley decision, Massachusetts’ highest court, following the reasoning in that case, held that if 
an owner publicly performs an unpublished play, then anyone, relying on his or her memory, can 
also perform that play.  Keene v. Kimball, 82 Mass. (15 Gray) 545, 549–51 (1860).  The Massa-
chusetts court overruled this decision over twenty years later in Tompkins v. Halleck, and held 
that public performance of a play will not deprive the owner from prohibiting others from per-
forming the play. 133 Mass. 32, 43–44 (Mass. 1882). 
70.  Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N.Y. 532, 543 (N.Y. 1872) (cited with approval in Naxos I). 
71.  Id. 
72.  Id. 
73.  See DRONE, supra note 67. 
74.  Naxos I, 830 N.E.2d at 264.  
75.  Id. at 263-64. 
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statutory copyright law, New York common law copyright arguably pro-
vides a performance right to pre-1972 sound recordings.76  First, common 
law copyright exists to the point that there is no statutory abrogation.77  
Congress, in the 1976 Copyright Act, expressly carved out an exception to 
federal statutory protection.78  Furthermore, New York has no statutory 
copyright law.  Second, common law copyright attaches to “unpublished” 
material;79 in other words, the monopoly extends only to first publication, 
and then that publication divests the owner of any copyright protection ab-
sent statutory protection.80  The Court of Appeals expressly held that copy-
ing and distributing a phonorecord does not constitute publication of a 
sound recording such that the owner divests himself of copyright protec-
tion.81  By implication, the facts of the case suggest that performing a 
sound recording is not publication for purposes of copyright divestiture.82  
Finally, common law copyright, because it is a property right,83 is more ex-
pansive in its protections than statutory copyright.84  Given that Congress 
has not exhausted the breadth of copyright protections and that it could 
provide a performance right in sound recordings,85 it seems logical to argue 
that the common law must therefore embrace such a protection.  Further-
more, commentators have noted that a common law copyright in a literary 
work can be infringed if that work is read in public.86 
 Although a strong argument exists for extending a common law per-
formance right to pre-1972 sound recordings, arguments also exist for find-
ing no such performance right in the common law.  First, copyright, as its 
name implies, has historically been limited to copying and distribution, and 
                                                           
76.  Id.  
77.  Id. at 262-263. 
78.  17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2008).  
79.  NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8. 
80.  Id. 
81.  Naxos I, 830 N.E.2d at 264. 
82.  This proposition is also supported by case law.  In other contexts, reading a manu-
script or performing a play that had not been distributed did not divest the owners of copyright 
protection.  Tompkins v. Halleck, 133 Mass. 32 (Mass. 1882).  Thus, courts found copyright in-
fringement where someone listening to the play copied it down and distributed it.  Keene v. 
Wheatley, 14 F. Cas. 180, 201 (E.D. Pa. 1861) (No. 7644). 
83.  See, e.g., Waring v. WDAS Broad. Station, Inc., 194 A. 631, 634 (Pa. 1937). 
84.  See generally Naxos I, 830 N.E.2d at 263. 
85.  See, e.g., Performance Rights in Sound Recordings: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, 95th Cong. 3 (1978) (statement of Bar-
bara Ringer, Register of Copyrights) (stating that “Congress is free to embrace additional subject 
matter and to extend exclusive rights under the umbrella Federal Copyright.”). 
86.  See DRONE, supra note 67. 
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any extension of the right has been by statute.87  Thus, a performance right 
was never recognized at common law and is only a statutory creation.  
However, this argument ignores the Supreme Court’s statement in Wheaton 
v. Peters that “the failure to assert any particular right may afford no evi-
dence of the non existence [sic] of such right.”88  The ability to embody a 
particular performance into a tangible medium that can be replayed and re-
distributed endlessly did not exist in 17th century England.  Prior to Tho-
mas Edison’s invention of the phonograph in the late 1800s, performances 
were ephemeral.89  Thus, there was no need for judicial or legislative assis-
tance to prohibit or restrict someone from reproducing that particular per-
formance.  Also, the fact that copyright originated in the context of copying 
books does not mean that the common law cannot evolve to embrace not 
only different subject matter, but also different rights.  To believe otherwise 
would destroy common law protection for anything but unpublished books. 
 Another argument against extending a performance right is that the 
Court of Appeals in Naxos I outlined the elements for a copyright in-
fringement claim, which necessarily limits the rights to copying and distri-
bution.  The court held that a “copyright infringement cause of action in 
New York consists of two elements:  (1) the existence of a valid copyright; 
and (2) unauthorized reproduction of the work protected by the copy-
right.”90  While the court seems to implicitly reject a performance right, 
such a restrictive reading of the decision is not warranted.  The Court of 
Appeals noted that “the copyright protection extended by state common 
law to sound recordings not covered by the federal Copyright Act is similar 
to the scope of common-law ownership rights in other forms of property . . 
. .”91  One such right in property is the exclusive right to use the property.92  
                                                           
87.  Even the case law giving a common law performance right to unpublished plays es-
tablished the right after federal law gave plays a performance right.  See Ferris v. Frohman, 223 
U.S. 424, 434 (1912).  Arguably, then, it was the fact that the play was unpublished, and not the 
fact that every unpublished work has a performance right that established the scope of the com-
mon law performance right. 
88.  Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 659 (1834). 
89.  See United States v. Western Electric Co., 531 F.Supp. 894, 913 (D.N.J. 1981) (noting 
that Thomas Edison invented the phonograph in 1877). 
90.  Naxos I, 830 N.E.2d at 266 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).  
91.  Naxos I, 830 N.E.2d at 265.  The court also noted that the original New York copy-
right statute “contemplated the existence of common-law copyright protections separate from 
statutory rights . . . .”  Id. at 257. 
92.  See Novelty Crystal Corp. v. PSA Institutional Partners, L.P., 850 N.Y.S.2d 497, 501 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (citing United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945)). 
Also, nothing in the 1909 Copyright Act limited the common law right of an author to “prevent 
the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished work . . . .”  Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. 
No. 60-349, §2, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (emphasis added). 
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Since performing the sound recording is a use of the protected work, it fol-
lows that an owner could restrict, prohibit, or control such use of his prop-
erty.  Also, the Court of Appeals was simply responding to the facts of the 
case, which involved unauthorized reproduction. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 Since the founding of this country, copyright has existed in both 
common law form at the state level and statutory form at the federal level.93  
In 2005, New York’s highest court for the first time held that New York 
law recognized a common law copyright in sound recordings.94  The court, 
however, did not define the scope of that protection.  The court left unan-
swered the question of whether pre-1972 sound recordings, under common 
law copyright, have a performance right.  Given the historical scope of 
common law copyright, the logical conclusion is that pre-1972 sound re-
cordings enjoy a performance right under New York common law.  Of 
course, the right may have little value at this point in time considering that 
the vast majority of sound recordings that are broadcast are protected under 
federal law.95  However, if Congress does extend a performance right to 
sound recordings protected under federal law, then pre-1972 sound record-




                                                           
93.  See generally Naxos I, 830 N.E.2d at 257 (discussing the nature of federal and state 
copyright law at the time of the founding and shortly thereafter). 
94.  See id. at 265. 
95.  See Naxos II, 372 F.3d at 477 (stating that recordings made before 1972 are “neither 
protected nor preempted by federal copyright law . . . .”). 
